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The American Law Institute's Official Draft of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States was published in 1987, twenty-two
years after the publication of its immediate predecessor' and almost ten years
after the inception of the so-called "Foreign Relations Project" by the Institute. 2
The very difficult circumstances which the Project had to encounter, and survive,
have been well documented, as has been the drafting process. 3 The purposes,
form, and content of the Restatement (Third) are now being exhaustively exam-
ined, analyzed, and interpreted.4 Indeed, some commentators, as a part of this
process of dissection, are already looking ahead to what Falk has described as the
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I. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).
2. See AMERICAN SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS, SEVENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 73-94
(1985) (contributions by A. M. Simon, Oscar Schachter, Jack M. Goldklang, Covey T. Oliver,
Jonathan I. Chaney, Richard B. Lillich, S. Houston Lay, Dinah Shelton, Michael J. Bazyler, Sam-
uel K. B. Asante, Elizabeth B. Impallomeni, David Small, Anne Bayetsky & Louis Henkin);
Houck, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and Reso-
lutions, 20 INT'L LAW. 1361 (1986).
3. Meessen, Special Review Essays: The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 433 (1989); Falk, Conceptual Foundations, 14 YALE J. INT'L
L. 439 (1989).
4. In addition to the series of Commentaries that are being published in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER (by Sir Joseph Gold, James R. Silkenat, and Brice M. Clagett and Daniel P. Poneman in
Vol. 22, No. I (Spring 1988); Don Wallace, Jr. and Joseph P. Griffin in Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1989);
Monroe Leigh and Werner F. Ebke and Mary E. Parker in Vol. 24, No. I (Spring 1990); Richard
Cunningham in Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 1990); Daniel T. Murphy in this issue; and others projected),
reference should be made to Special Review Essays: The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the U.S., 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 433 (1989) (contributions by Karl M. Meessen, Richard A.
Falk, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Cecil J. Olmstead, Ruth Wedgwood, W. T. Burke, David D. Caron,
Lung-Chu-Chen, William E. Holder, and Lea Brilmayer).
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"next photo opportunity," that of the occasion of drafting the Restatement
(Fourth). 5
Although this Restatement (Third) does stand on the shoulders of its prede-
cessors, it was acknowledged at a very early stage of the Project that certain
topics, including most notably the law of the sea, would require "different and
more extended restatement for the last decades of the twentieth century." 6 At the
time of the inception of the Project, the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was moving into the most crucial phase of its
negotiations on the way to the adoption, in 1982, of a Convention on the Law of
the Sea. The Convention must now be regarded, whatever view one may take as
to the status or merits of its disparate but closely interrelated parts, as represent-
ing the most sustained, most complex, and most ambitious attempt to restruc-
ture international law in modem times. The negotiations proceeded at the same
time as the debates over Restatement formulations. The eventual shape of the
UNCLOS III "package deal" was being crystallized, and the eventual "unity"
of the 1982 Convention was being established, while the Project reporters and
their advisers endeavored to select and appraise those topics within the general
ambit of the law of the sea considered as necessary and appropriate for inclusion
in Part V of the Restatement. The reporters were thus in the unenviable position
of shooting at a rapidly moving target.
In 1965 the previous Restatement articulated, in its Introductory Notes, rules
of law presented in black-letter type, and in the accompanying Comments and
Reporters' Notes, the law of the sea primarily as reflected in the four
conventions adopted by the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva in 1958. 7 The United States became a party to each
of the Geneva Conventions. UNCLOS III, negotiated between 1973 and 1982,
came into existence partially because of the inadequacies inherent in the Geneva
Conventions of 1958, but primarily because of expectations and influences that
stemmed from a fundamentally transformed world community. 8 As the
Secretary-General of the United Nations said when the 1982 Convention was
opened for signature: "The convening of the Conference [UNCLOS III] set in
motion not only a complex negotiating process at several levels but at the same
5. Falk, supra note 3, at 439-54.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1986)
(hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Other topics identified in this way include diplomatic relations,
international economic intercourse, dispute settlement, and cooperation in law enforcement.
7. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
8. See the pessimistic comments of the progenitor of UNCLOS III, Pardo, An Opportunity Lost,
in LAW OF THE SEA 13-25 (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C. Buderi eds. 1983).
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time an accelerated process of change in the conduct of States vis- -vis the uses
of the sea."
9
At the Tenth Session of UNCLOS III, which was held in New York between
March 9 and April 24, 1981, the Conference was confronted by the decision of
the new United States administration to undertake a thorough review of the then
draft Convention. Moreover, the new administration requested that the Confer-
ence should not complete its negotiations and proceed to the formalization of an
official text of the Convention until the following year. '0 The United States did
not effectively participate or negotiate in the Tenth (Resumed) Session of the
Conference which was held in Geneva between August 3 and August 28, 1981.
The Reagan administration did not complete its policy review until January 29,
1982,11 and, when the Eleventh (and final) Session of the Conference opened in
March 1982, it was agreed that there would be no significant changes in the
official text of the draft Convention, which had been adopted at the close of the
Tenth Session,' 2 unless such changes enhanced the possibility of achieving con-
sensus. After the publication of the United States' notorious "Green Book"'
13
and the failure of efforts to bridge the gap between the United States and the
Group of 77 over the deep seabed mining provisions of Part XI of the draft
Convention, the Convention, together with Resolutions I-IV, was adopted by a
recorded vote taken on April 30, 1982.14
The Convention was opened for signature in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on De-
cember 10, 1982.15 At the time of this writing, it has attracted forty-two
9. Statement by Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar, printed in THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX XXiX-XXXii,
at xxx, U.N. Sales No. E. 83.V.5 (1983).
10. XVII R. PLATZODER, THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCu-
MENTS 268-70 (1988); see also Larson, The Reagan Administration and the Law of the Sea, 11
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 297 (1982); Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the UN Convention, 14 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 337 (1985).
11. Larson, supra note 10, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. at 345-48.
12. This replaced the previous "informal text." See the recommendations of the Collegium (the
collective name for the Officers of the Conference-the President of the Conference, the Chairmen
of the Main Committees and the Rapporteur) in UN Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR. 14 (1982).
13. See also Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
FREIGN AFF. 1006-21 (1982); J. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 81-96 (1984).
Conditions for the United States' return to the UNCLOS III negotiations, as set out by President
Reagan, appeared in U.S. Dep't of State, CURRENT POL'Y No. 371 (Jan./Feb. 1982).
14. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.182 (1982); XVIII K. PLATZODER, supra note 10, at 138-39.
The recorded vote on the adoption of the text produced 130 votes in favor to 4 against (Israel, Turkey,
the United States, and Venezuela), with 17 abstentions (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, the Ukrainian S.S.R., and
the United Kingdom). After the vote the delegation of Liberia requested the Secretariat to place on
record that it had abstained from the vote.
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, Oct. 7, 1982,
incorporating U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/122/Corr.3, Nov. 23, 1982, and A/CONF.62/122/Corr.8,
Nov. 26, 1982 [hereinafter Convention].
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ratifications. 16 It will enter into force twelve months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. 17 The United States announced
its rejection of the Convention very soon after the Convention's adoption. Fol-
lowing a further brief policy review, President Reagan announced at meetings of
the National Security Council on June 29 and July 9, 1982, "that the United States
will not sign the Convention as adopted by the Conference, and our participation
in the remaining Conference process will be at the technical level and will involve
only those provisions that serve U.S. interests . 1...8 He did, however, add that
the Convention "contains many positive and very significant points dealing with
navigation and overflight, and most other provisions of the Convention are con-
sistent with U.S. interests and, in our view, serve well the interests of all nations." 19
The United States was represented at the Eleventh (and final) Session of
UNCLOS III at Montego Bay, and it duly signed the Final Act signifying its
participation in the Conference. 20 The United States has, however, consistently
maintained that the deep seabed mining provisions of Part XI of the Convention
are "hopelessly flawed '"2' and has adopted the view that, in present circum-
stances and with an inchoate Convention, deep seabed mining, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, is permissible under international law and remains es-
sentially one of the high seas freedoms. 22 Moreover, since the passage into law
of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980,23 the United States,
while accepting that it does not seek to "assert sovereignty or sovereign or
exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources
in the deep seabed, ' 24 has taken the lead in establishing the so-called "recip-
rocating States' regime," which purports to regulate deep seabed mining outside
the Convention.
25
When President Reagan issued his Proclamation of March 10, 1983,26 on the
establishment of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), within which the United
16. As of Oct. 15, 1989. For details, see NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA Document
U.3.A (K. Simmonds ed. 1990).
17. Convention, supra note 15, art. 308(I).
18. U.S. Dep't of State, Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy, CURRENT POL'Y No. 416 (July/Aug.
1982).
19. id.
20. U.N. Does. A/CONF.62/121, Oct. 27, 1982, incorporating U.N. Does. A/CONF.62/121/
Corr.3, Dec. 6, 1982, and A/CONF.62/121/Corr.7, Dec. 6, 1982. See the survey in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 6, pt. V, introductory note at 4-5.
21. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION, ISSUE UPDATE No. 10, THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION 8 (Apr. 15, 1983); see also United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoCs.
383 (Mar. 14, 1983).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 523 & comment c.
23. 30 U.S.C. § 1401; Act of June 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat. 553) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1401).
24. Id. § 1402(a)(2).
25. See Simmonds, Deep Seabed Mining: The Protection of Pioneer investment under the United
Nations Preparatory Commission, in PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-48 (W. Butler ed.
1990).
26. United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoCs. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
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States intended to exercise sovereign rights over living and nonliving resources
within 200 nautical miles from its coasts, he primarily recognized the force of the
consensus that had emerged in UNCLOS III on the concept of the EEZ (to use
the language of the Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Case
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary of the Gulf of Maine
(Canada/United States)27 -a consensus that may "be regarded as consonant at
present with general international law on the question.' 28) He was, however,
careful to add that "the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance
with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans ...." 29
Although, in context, this statement referred only to the reciprocal recognition
of interests with respect to navigational and overflight rights and freedoms, the
Restatement (Third) reporters rashly advance the view that "by express or tacit
agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the United States, and states
generally, have accepted the substantive provisions of the Convention, other than
those addressing deep seabed mining, as statements of customary law binding
upon them apart from the Convention."' 30 Although the statement is accompa-
nied by a series of derogations throughout the text of Part V of the Restatement
(Third), it appears to be a dangerous over-simplification and it has been attacked
as a "mistreatment of customary international law" and as reflecting "strongly
the political thrust of the pronouncements about customary law issued by the
Reagan Administration after it rejected the 1982 Convention .... 31
The Restatement (Third), like its predecessors, is practitioner-oriented and
specifically attempts "to express the law as it would be pronounced by a disin-
terested tribunal, whether of the United States or some other national state or an
international tribunal." 32 The American Law Institute's views on state practice as
customary law and on the determination of the sources and the weight of the
evidence as to whether or not rules or principles have become international law
are set out in detail in the Introductory Note and in Part I, Chapter One, of the
Restatement (Third). 33 They include the following statements: "Customary in-
ternational law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation" '3 4 and "for customary law the 'best
evidence' is proof of state practice, ordinarily by reference to official documents
and other indications of governmental action."
35
Even in a brief survey of Part V, such as is possible in the present article, it
is therefore necessary to focus attention upon the reporters' perception and
27. 1984 I.C.J. 246
28. Id. at 294.
29. United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, pt. V, introductory note at 5.
31. Burke, Customary Law of the Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 508, 527 (1989).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, at xi.
33. Id. vol. 1, pt. I, ch. 1, at 16, 18-19, and §§ 102, 103 at 24, 35.
34. Id. § 102(2); see also id. comment b and reporters' note 2.
35. Id. § 103 comment a, second para.
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articulation of the extent and content of customary law, as evidenced by the
substantive provisions of the inchoate 1982 Convention or by state practice
outside the Convention. The Restatement (Third), Part V,3 6 covers (i) ships
(including the nationality of ships and the rights and duties of the flag state);37 (ii)
rights and duties of coastal and port states (including rights in the territorial sea,
the straits, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, and the archipe-
lagic waters); 38 and (iii) high seas (including high seas freedoms, exceptional
jurisdiction on the high seas, and exploration and exploitation of the mineral
resources of the deep seabed). 39 This commentary follows the sequence of pre-
sentation of topics adopted in the Restatement (Third) and offers selective com-
ments in light of the central focus of attention indicated above.
A note of warning is definitely required, however. Part V of the Restatement
(Third) clearly states the premise that:
[Tihe Convention as such is not law of the United States. However, many of the
provisions of the Convention follow closely provisions in the 1958 conventions to
which the United States is a party and which largely restated customary law as of that
time. Other provisions in the LOS Convention set forth rules that, if not law in 1958,
became customary law since that time, as they were accepted at the Conference by
consensus and have influenced, and came to reflect, the practice of states.
40
In spite of this statement there is, regrettably, little consistency of approach in
Part V either as to where, in the reporters' views, the Convention does not reflect
(or departs from) customary international law or where the Convention provi-
sions are not applicable to the United States in the absence of specific United
States adherence in practice. Although there are certain explicit references to
these ends,4 1 such references are notably by their absence in several important
passages,42 and, as has been noted above, the treatment of the bases and the
content of customary law is often open to serious criticism.43
II. Ships
A. THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS
The Restatement (Third) sets out a black-letter rule in categorical terms that at
once draws attention to the problems outlined above: "A ship has the nationality
of the state that registered it and authorized it to fly the state's flag, but a state
36. Id. vol. 2, pt. V, introductory note and §§ 501-523 at 3-98.
37. Id. §§ 501, 502.
38. Id. §§ 511-517.
39. Id. §§ 521-523.
40. Id. pt. V, introductory note at 5.
41. See, e.g., id. § 502 comment f; § 511 reporters' note 8; § 514 comments b, j and reporters'
notes 2, 4; § 515 comments a, b and reporters' note 1; and § 523 comment e and reporters' note 3.
42. See, e.g., the commentary below, text at notes 50-55, following notes 63 & 77, and at notes
82-89, 97-103, 108-10, 117-24, 134-36, 150-56.
43. Burke, supra note 31, especially at 508-12.
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may properly register a ship and authorize it to fly the state's flag only if there
is a genuine link between the state and the ship." 44 The authority for this
proposition is stated to be derived from Articles 5 and 6 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas and from Articles 91 and 92 of the 1982 Conven-
tion. This commentary is not the place to retrace the long, and still unresolved,
debate over the propriety of the term "nationality" to define the legal relation-
ships between a state and a ship that is authorized by the state to fly its flag,45 or
the debate over the requirement of a "genuine link" between a ship and its flag
state. 46 As O'Connell has clearly demonstrated, it is extremely difficult to at-
tribute coherent meaning to the expression "nationality of a ship," and a "ship
without nationality" is not necessarily a ship without law.47 The failure over very
many years to agree upon the connecting factors in nationality, and the conse-
quent failure to resolve the controversy over the proliferation of "flags of con-
venience," was certainly not brought to an end by the adoption of either the 1958
or the 1982 texts. The Restatement (Third) makes reference to the attempts made
in the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for the Registration of
Ships 48 to elaborate on the principle of the "genuine link," but does not disclose
the conditions for registration or for the determination of a "genuine link"
(which we must now call "open registry") 4 9 that were finally adopted in that
Convention at the conclusion of a lengthy and contentious Conference that was
convened under the auspices of UNCTAD.
The black-letter proposition here may possibly be said to represent a statement
of majority world community expectations, but it does not present a rule that
reflects the condition of contemporary customary international law nor do the
Comments or Reporters' Notes present convincing authority in support of the
proposition .5 One may also doubt whether the proposition reflects current U.S.
practice, 5 1 since differing legislative requirements in different states assert rights
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 501.
45. See Summary Records of the 121st Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 328-29, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/42 (1951).
46. A landmark in this debate was the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
given in Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization IMCO, 1960 I.C.J. 150, and 1960 I.C.J. Pleadings 357, 365, 374, 404
(submissions of United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Norway, and Liberia); see Simmonds, The
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO, 12 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 56-87 (1963).
47. 11 D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 750-61 (1. Shearer ed. 1984).
48. Adopted Feb. 7, 1986; U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF.23, Mar. 13, 1986. This Convention was
adopted by consensus (U.N. Doc. A/41/301, para. 3 (1986)), but will not come into effect until
ratified by not less than forty states having registered vessels with a combined tonnage amounting to
at least 25 percent of total world tonnage. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 19 & annex III.
49. Convention, supra note 15, arts. 4-8; see also Sturmey, The United Nations Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1987 LLOYDS MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 97.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 501 comment b and reporters' note 4.
51. Burke, supra note 31, at 518 (notes omitted), has acidly commented:
The remarkable thing about this treatment is that one would never guess that it is a
"restatement" of the law of the state which created the modem concept of flags of
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of jurisdiction over ships on the ground of ownership or control by U.S. citizens,
even when documented under foreign law and on the high seas. 52 Nationality is
not dependent solely upon documentation, and there is no unique connection
between the national identity of a ship for the purposes of jurisdiction and the flag
flying. 53 Furthermore, the legal requirements in the United States with respect of
the documentation of vessels 54 provide that a certificate of documentation is
conclusive evidence of nationality for international purposes, but is not conclu-
sive evidence of ownership in proceedings conducted under the laws of the
United States.55
A new dimension to the underlying problems concerning "open registry"
vessels has emerged in recent years in the European Community. A central
feature of the Community's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (the basic elements
of which were finally agreed to in January 1983 after over six years of
negotiations) 56 is the establishment of total allowable catches (TACs) for the
various stocks of fish found in the waters of Community Member States. Such
TACs are then divided into quotas that are allocated periodically to individual
Member States. Moreover, quotas can only be fished for by vessels having the
nationality of the Member State within the appropriate allocation. 57 "Quota
hopping" has become, in recent practice, a valuable appurtenance to a "flag of
convenience" since, under the laws of some Member States, the conditions
governing the acquisition of nationality for vessels are so flexible as to allow
interests from another Member State (or from a third state outside the Commu-
nity) to register vessels in their ownership under the flag of such "liberal"
Member State. 58 These flexible conditions for the acquisition of nationality
through vessel registration allow foreign-owned vessels to fish for quotas allo-
cated to a Member State.
Ireland and the United Kingdom have suffered especially from the practice of
"quota hopping," but the legislative measures they have adopted in order to
convenience, which has most actively promoted the great ease of registry in particular
nations, and whose nationals are still among the largest investors in vessels using such
flags.
52. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 732 (1940-44); 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1963-73).
53. The Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Xl R. Int'l Arb. Awards 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905); 111
K. SIMMONDS, CASES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA app. 331-41 & 334-35 (1980).
54. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 12101-12309 (West Pam. Supp. 1990).
55. Id. § 121104.
56. Simmonds, The European Economic Community and the New Law of the Sea, RECUEIL DES
COURS ch. III (1990) (in the press); R.R. CHURCHILL, EEC FISHERIES LAW 1-50 (1987); the basic
Community legislation is to be found in Reg. 170/83, O.J. (No. L 24/1), arts. 3 & 4 (1983), as
amended.
57. Reg. 2241/87, O.J. (No. L 207/1), art. 11 (1987).
58. It is significant that in its original proposals for a Common Fisheries Policy, which were
promulgated in 1966, the European Commission recommended the national legislation relating to the
nationality of fishing vessels should be harmonized; J.0. 876 (1967).
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counter it 59 have run into substantial difficulties as to their compatibility with
various principles of Community law. The European Court of Justice has ren-
dered a number of decisions, and other cases are currently pending. 60 It seems
likely that Community law cannot, in its present condition, do more than restrain
the practice of "quota hopping," and that in the longer term the future of the CFP
may come to depend upon the replacement of national shipping registers in the
twelve Community Member States by a single Community register and a single
Community flag. The extent to which Community law may restrict the power that
Member States currently have under international law to determine the conditions
under which they will allow vessels to fly their flags is still not fully settled. 6' It
would appear, however, that the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions
for the Registration of Ships, which is not in force and which no Member State
of the European Community has yet ratified, is incompatible with Community
law, and that any Member States seeking to ratify that Convention would be
required to do so by making a reservation in a form already recommended by the
European Commission.
62
In the pleadings in the current round of cases to which reference has been
made, there are, of course, very frequent allusions to the objectives of articles 5
and 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and to articles 91, 92,
and 94 of the 1982 Convention. These allusions are very similar in their language
to the proposition contained in section 501 of the Restatement (Third). The
practice of the states making these submissions, as evidenced in their national
legislation to date, does not, however, indicate any general agreement on the
connecting factors in nationality, the conditions of registration, or the rules for
the determination of a "genuine link." The limitations superimposed by inter-
59. For Ireland, see Fisheries (Amendment) Act, 1983; Sea-Fishing Boats Regulations, 1986;
and Case 223/86, Pesca Valentia Ltd. v. Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, Ireland, and the
Attorney-General, [1988] E.C.R. 83. For the United Kingdom, see: British Fishing Boats Order
1983, S.I. 1983, No. 482; Sea Fish Licensing Order 1983, S.I. 1983, No. 1206; Merchant Shipping
Act 1988, 1988 c. 12, esp. §§ 2, 13(2) & 14; and Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing
Vessels) Regulations 1988, S.I. 1988, No. 1926.
60. Case 280/89, Commission v. Ireland, 32 O.J. (No. C 285/4) (1989) (decision pending); Case
93/89, Commission v. Ireland, 32 O.J. (No. C 107/18) 13 (1989) (decision pending); Case 3/87, R.
v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Agegate Ltd., [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366; R.
v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow Ltd. (not yet reported); Case
279/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, 32 O.J. (No. C 275/6) (1989) (decision pending); Case
221/89, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd., 32 O.J. (No. C 211/13 (1989)
(decision pending; for the judgment of the Divisional Court in England, see [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 353);
Case 246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, 32 O.J. (No. C 229/6) (1989) (decision pending).
61. But see the Order for Interim Relief granted by the President of the European Court of Justice
on Oct. 10, 1989, in Case 246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 601. This
Order was implemented in the United Kingdom through the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (Amend-
ment) Order 1989, S.I. 1989, No. 2006; see Simmonds, supra note 56, ch. Ill.
62. See COM (86) 523. Eight Member States of the European Community (Belgium, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom)
have ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7; no Member State of the
European Community has yet ratified the 1982 LOS Convention.
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national law upon the right of states to decide for themselves under their mu-
nicipal law6 3 these connecting factors, conditions, and rules are still unclear and
unsettled. The black-letter rule in section 501 of the Restatement (Third) is not
reflective of the current condition of international law, nor of the current practice
of the United States. It must also be noted that there is no evidence that the
"genuine link" formula has had any substantial practical effect in inhibiting the
growth of "open registry" shipping.
B. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE FLAG STATE
The Restatement (Third) section 502(1)(a) follows section 28(2) of the previ-
ous Restatement, but section 502 continues (in subsections (1)(b)(i) and (ii) and
(2)) with provisions that were not covered by the previous Restatement. Section
502(1)(a) articulates the black-letter rule that "[t]he flag state is required to
exercise effective authority and control over the ship in administrative, technical,
and labor matters." Article 94 of the 1982 Convention, which refers to effective
authority and control over "administrative, technical and social matters'' 64
spells out a detailed, but nonexhaustive, list of measures to be taken by a flag
state65 in exercising this jurisdiction that goes beyond the Restatement (Third)
proposition and its following Comment. 66 The situation where the coastal state
may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over matters that are within the flag state's
responsibility for the control of a ship when travelling through the territorial sea
is dealt with in a later provision, 67 where the treatment of access to ports is open
to serious criticism. 68 Article 20 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone was incorporated without change into article 28
of the 1982 Convention. Comment on the rights of a coastal state to control the
entry of foreign vessels into its ports, and, more especially, on access to U.S.
coastal waters and ports, is reserved until later in this article. 69
The Restatement (Third) section 502(l)(b) goes on to add that the flag state is
required:
(i) to take such measures as are necessary to ensure safety at sea, avoid collisions, and
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, and
(ii) to adopt laws and regulations and take such other steps as are needed to conform
these measures to generally accepted international standards, regulations, procedures,
and practices, and to secure their implementation and observance.
63. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953).
64. Convention, supra note 15, art. 94(1) (emphasis added).
65. Id. art. 94(2), (3) & (4); see also arts. 108(2), 109(3)(a) & 113. Compare the general
principles set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7, art. 5(a).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 502 comment b and reporters' note 1.
67. Id. § 512 and reporter's notes 5 & 7.
68. Infra text at notes 86-89; Burke, supra note 4, at 520-22.
69. Infra text at notes 88-89.
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Frequent reference to the applicability of generally recognized "international
regulations, practices and procedures" 70 to "international rules or standards,"
7
'
or to "international standards" 72 is an innovative and controversial characteristic
of the 1982 Convention. These references are made in a wide variety of contexts
in addition to those alluded to in the language of section 502(l)(b)(ii) 73 and are
applied especially to the laws and regulations of a coastal state relating to inno-
cent passage in the territorial sea, to transit passage in straits, to archipelagic sea
lanes passage, or to the construction, operation, and utilization of artificial
islands and similar structures in the EEZ. Above all, such references have at-
tracted widespread attention in their use in certain of the 1982 Convention
provisions on the prevention, reduction, and control of vessel-source pollution.74
The 1982 Convention establishes general principles and policies that seek to
govern the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of all kinds throughout
the entire marine environment. The allocation of specific rights and the imposi-
tion of specific burdens varies according to the source, the location, and the type
of pollution involved. The Convention is intended to be compatible with, and
complementary to, the principal existing multilateral treaties and to provide a
framework upon which future sectoral agreements can rest. Yet, the Convention
does not adopt a uniform stance on the regulation of all sources of pollution. The
effect of the 1982 Convention's pollution provisions is ambulatory, and, since
the treaties vary in their requirements, and the parties to them also vary, the point
of reference is ambiguous. As O'Connell has said:
If it is always the latest Convention that is to be that point of reference, then a novel
system of legislative repeal has been devised, the effect of which would be to render
older treaties automatically inoperative when their standards have been changed by later
ones, and that would be an innovation in treaty law, which it is doubtful that customary
law could achieve of its own mechanics."
It is unfortunate that the Restatement (Third) does not, either in the Comment
or the Reporters' Notes, indicate the criteria for "general acceptance" or identify
(with one exception 76) the treaties from which are derived what the reporters
4
70. Convention, supra note 15, arts. 21(4), 39(2), 41(3), 53(8), 94(2)(a), & 94(5).
71. Convention, supra note 15, arts. 21(2), 211(2), 211(5), 211(6)(c), & 226(l)(a).
72. Id. arts. 60(3), 60(5) & 60(6).
73. Which attempts in composite form to refer to the Convention, supra note 15, arts. (94)(4)(c),
94(5), 192, 194, 211, 217 & 219; but cf. the language of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 7, arts. 5(1), 10, 11, 24 & 25.
74. Boyle, Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 347,
353-54 (1985); Van Reenen, Rules of Reference in the New Convention on the Law of the Sea, 12
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1981); D. Vignes, La valeur juridique de certaines regles, normes ou
pratiques mentionnges au TNCO comme "g~ndralement accept~es," 1979 ANNUAIRE FRAN4cAISE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 712; Simmonds, supra note 56, ch. IV.
75. II D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 997.
76. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No.
9700, with Protocol Relating to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1978,
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describe as "the broader obligation" that "has become binding on all flag states
as a matter of customary international law." 77 It is true that the use of rules of
reference in the Convention is far from satisfactory. The treatment of this subject
in the Restatement (Third) adds weight to the view that a substantial level of
discretion still remains for the flag state to interpret, prescribe, and apply pol-
lution standards and obligations. Again, the reader is given no real guidance as
to the practice of the United States or of other flag states that have refused to
ratify or apply the relevant international conventions, but that, at least in theory,
have indicated that they are prepared to accept the Convention's compromise
formulations on rules of reference.
III. Rights and Duties of Coastal and Port States
A. THE TERRITORIAL SEA
The Restatement (Third) uses the phrase "zones of adjacent sea" when deal-
ing with the authority exercised by a coastal state over the territorial sea, over
passage through the territorial sea, over straits and archipelagic waters, over the
EEZ, and over the continental shelf. 78 As expected, the Restatement (Third)
relies very heavily on language used in the 1982 Convention 79 (itself drawn in
part from the formulations adopted in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone8°), but scant attention is paid to the
delimitation of baselines. Unexpectedly, there is only a very brief reference to the
considerable body of jurisprudence in the United States where the Supreme
Court has applied the language of the 1958 Convention on baselines to litigation
over the delimitation of federal and state boundaries. 
8 1
More significantly, the Restatement (Third) does not address the very difficult
questions provoked by the substantial variations in state practice over the use of
straight baselines. The weaknesses of the existing prescriptions, in both the 1958
and the 1982 Conventions, 82 have been amply illustrated in the valuable series of
studies produced by The Geographer of the State Department.83 In a recent
overall survey of high authority, Prescott has written:
32 U.S.T. 5577, T.I.A.S. No. 10009. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, vol. 2, pt. V, introductory
note 7, and § 502 comment c and reporters' note 2.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 502 reporters' note 2.
78. Id. § 511.
79. Convention, supra note 15, arts. 2(1), 3, 5, 55, 57 & 76.
80. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 7, arts.
1(l), 3 & 5.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 511 comment d and reporters' notes 3, 4 & 5.
82. Convention, supra note 15, art. 7; 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, supra note 7, art. 4; see I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 199-218.
83. Especially illuminating is the series LIMITS IN THE SEAS, in particular, nos. 103 COLOMBIA
(1985), 99 VIETNAM (1983), 42 ECUADOR (1972), and 14 BURMA (1970).
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There is no point in making an exhaustive analysis of the range of meanings which can
be attached to the terms . . . [articulated in article 7 of the 1982 Convention] . . .
because there is not the slightest evidence that the majority of coastal states is interested
in more precise definition of any of these terms. Agreement on the rules quoted was
reached very early in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. That is not
surprising because the imprecise language would allow any coastal country, anywhere
in the world, to draw straight baselines along its coasts.84
The writer is aware of over fifty cases in which states have drawn straight
baselines along all or part of their coasts and of a further fifteen cases in which
states have adopted enabling legislation, but have not yet published the delimi-
tation. In over half of these cases there are major departures from the prescrip-
tions in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. 85 It is true that the Restatement (Third)
does make allusions to the concessive character of article 4 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which the United
States is a party, but the failure of the Restatement (Third) to deal adequately
with the meaning and/or status of article 7 of the 1982 Convention, either in
general or in U.S. practice, is both confusing and disturbing in light of what
follows in sections 511-517.
By contrast, the vexed question of the right of access of foreign vessels to the
ports of a coastal state is given extensive coverage, 86 but the discussion is at the
least tendentious and at the worst misleading. As this feature of the Restatement
(Third) has already been the subject of a very well argued critical analysis by
Burke,87 only a brief reference is necessary here. Does such a right exist in
customary international law as the Restatement (Third) asserts? Burke has con-
vincingly argued that the evidence presented in the Restatement (Third) to sup-
port the proposition that a general right of access does exist, in time of peace and
for merchant vessels, is unconvincing both doctrinally and in the light of state
practice. One of the most recent comprehensive scholarly treatments of the
subject, by Kasoulides, confirms the earlier view of Lowe, 88 that, in the absence
of treaty law, the presumption that the international ports of a state are open to
international merchant traffic had not acquired the status of a right, except only
for vessels in distress seeking safety.
89
84. J.R.V. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 52, 54-55, 63-66,
67-70 & 313-18 (1985); see D. JOHNSTON, THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF OCEAN BOUNDARY-
MAKING 114 (1988).
85. Some examples are printed in the collection of documents in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA, supra note 16, pt. c. See also the discussion in J.R.V. PRESCOTr, supra note 84, at 52,
54-55, 65-70, 163-67, 215-16, 237-41, 259-64, 278-80, 296-98 & 336-38.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 512 comment c and reporters' notes 3 & 4.
87. Burke, supra note 31, at 520-22.
88. G. KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION (in the press); Lowe, The Right of
Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 597 (1977).
89. See the "test of distress" laid down by Sir William Scott in The Eleanor, 1809 Edw. 135,
165 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1809) and the annotation to the reprint of this case in I K. SIMMONDS, CASES
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 98-138 (1976).
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B. PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL
SEA, STRAITS, AND ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS
Article 16(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone provided that "There shall be no suspension of the innocent
passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international naviga-
tion between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the
territorial sea of a foreign State." This formulation has been described as "[a]
codification which failed to cover the most significant categories of straits." 90 It
did, of course, alter the existing law for the parties to that Convention, and it
brought into the regime of straits the other provisions of the Convention relating
to the regime of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 9' It was clear long
before the opening of the UNCLOS III negotiations that the debate over passage
through straits would have a very different focus. The fundamental compromise
in all of the UNCLOS III negotiations set the maximum breadth of the territorial
sea at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the baselines of a coastal state; all
of the other interlocking compromise arrangements, which together make up the
1982 Convention, rest upon that. The threat of enclosure within double the new
territorial sea limits of over 130 straits led to prolonged debate over the
characterization of the waters within straits 92 in the light of rapidly changing
interests.
The major maritime powers sought to protect their economic interests by
securing adequate guarantees for commercial passage through international
straits. Moreover, the superpowers, from the outset, were determined that their
strategic and security interests, in particular with respect to the global deploy-
ment of nuclear submarines, would not be adversely affected by the expansion of
the jurisdictional rights of the states flanking such straits.93
The two new legal rights of passage eventually agreed upon in the 1982
Convention sought to accommodate these conflicting economic, security, and
environmental interests. The new regime of transit passage94 through interna-
tional straits allows for the exercise of a limited freedom of navigation (and of
overflight) between one area of the high seas, or an economic zone, and another,
or in order to enter or leave a port of a flanking state. This right of passage cannot
90. I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 316. It was directed primarily toward securing a right of
access to the Israeli port of Eilat through the Straits of Tiran, which were under Arab control at that
time.
91. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 7, arts.
14-23.
92. See Anand, Transit Passage and Overflight in International Straits, 26 IND. J. INT'L L. 72
(1986); Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980).
93. Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Law-
making, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48-76 (1980).
94. Convention, supra note 15, arts. 38(2), 38(3), 39(1)(a), 39(1)(b), 40, 42, & 44.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
LAW OF THE SEA 945
be suspended for security or for other reasons, and it extends to all vessels and
aircraft, military and commercial. Archipelagic sea lanes passage95 is very sim-
ilar to transit passage through straits, and the rights duties of flag states and of the
archipelagic state are the same, mutatis mutandis, as the rights and duties of flag
states and of straits states in respect of transit passage. Other provisions in the
1982 Convention do, however, give straits states additional jurisdictional author-
ity in respect of control of pollution both in their territorial seas and in their
straits. 96 This additional authority does not extend to the new regime of archi-
pelagic waters and thus to the 1982 Convention provisions on archipelagic sea
lanes passage.
Each of these two new regimes gives the coastal state less control over passing
vessels than does the regime of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Neither affords the same freedom of navigation to such vessels as would have
been the case if the waters concerned had been part of the high seas. The
Restatement (Third) here generally adopts the position that the rights of transit
passage secured under the provisions of the 1982 Convention reflect the current
condition of customary international law, 97 and one Comment asserts that "[r]e-
cent practice of states, supported by the broad consensus achieved at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, has effectively established as
customary international law the concept and the basic rules of transit passage
through international straits and sea-lanes passage through archipelagic
waters."
98
That assertion is highly questionable, and it is unsupported in the Restatement
(Third) by evidence of recent practice. 99 It is clear that certain states bordering
some straits of particular importance to international navigation have granted
explicit rights of this kind and other flanking states have either acquiesced in such
passage or have accepted that such passage was indeed transit passage. During
the passage of the Territorial Sea Act 19871°° through the Parliament of the
United Kingdom it was specifically announced that rights equivalent to a right of
passage would be afforded in the Strait of Dover and in certain other straits
adjoining the United Kingdom. Examples of such an explicit grant of rights are,
however, infrequent, and in the series of specialist studies on the major interna-
tional straits of the world, currently being produced under the editorship of
Gerard J. Mangone, 1° 1 most of the evidence produced suggests that the regime
95. Id. arts. 53(1), 53(4).
96. Id. arts. 220, 233.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 513(2)(a), (b) comments j & k and reporters' notes
3 & 4.
98. Id. § 513 comment j (emphasis added).
99. Burke, supra note 31, at 513-15.
100. See 484 PARL. H.L. DEB. col. 382 (Hansard Feb. 5, 1987).
101. The series began with W. BUTLER, NORTHEAST ARCTIC PASSAGE (1978). Subsequent volumes
include: M. LEIFER, MALACCA, SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA (1978); R. RAMAZANI, THE PERSIAN GULF
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of innocent passage is applicable, although in a very few cases the regime of
transit passage may more closely approximate the actual practice of states. That
practice is nevertheless often unclear or ambivalent; it cannot be said in any way
to justify the categorical claim made in the Restatement (Third) that state practice
since the 1982 Convention has generated a right of transit passage in customary
law. The ability to exercise rights of transit passage through international straits
remains, of course, a matter of the greatest importance for the United States, and
it is understandable that her government should consistently claim that such
rights exist in international law. For the Restatement (Third) to adopt a similar
stance, without adequate analysis of actual practice, is at best misleading and
likely to arouse criticism as to motive as well as to argument. 1
0 2
A similar comment may be made with respect to the treatment in the Restate-
ment (Third) of the right of warships to innocent passage in the territorial sea.
The core of the continuing controversy here was identified by Elihu Root as
counsel for the United States in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration in
1910: "War-ships may not pass without consent into this zone, because they
threaten. Merchant-ships may pass and repass, because they do not threaten." 1
0 3
The League of Nations Codification Conference, which met at The Hague in
1930, produced a text that provided: "As a general rule, a coastal State will not
forbid the passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea and will not require a
previous authorization or notification." 0 4 The text put forward by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, which was considered in UNCLOS I in Geneva in 1958,
recognized that many states did in practice require prior authorization and/or
notification and proposed that these conditions be written into the Geneva
Convention. 105 In the event the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone contained no express provision on the matter but its
article 14(1) provided: "Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all
states, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea." Since 1958 very differing conclusions have been drawn, both
by ratifying and nonratifying states, as to the meaning and scope of this provi-
AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ (1979); S. TRUVER, THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
(1980); R. LAPIDOTH-ESCHELBACHER, THE RED SEA AND THE GULF OF ADEN (1982); G. ALEXANDERS-
SON, THE BALTIC STRAITS (1982); L. CUYVERS, THE STRAIT OF DOVER (1986); C. PARK, THE KOREAN
STRAITS (1988). See W. BUTLER, supra, at 137-43; M. LEIFER, supra, at 86-104; S. TRUVER, supra,
at 159-83; G. ALEXANDERSSON, supra, at 81-85; R. LAPIDOTH-ESCHELBACHER, supra, at 146-49;
L. CUYVERS, supra, at 46-54; C. PARK, supra, at 75-76.
102. Burke, supra note 31, at 514-15.
103. Xl NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 2007; IV K. SIMMONDS,
supra note 89, at 157.
104. Report of the First Sub-Committee, League of Nations Doc. C.230 M. 117 1930 V, art. 12,
at 5, 6; see also Doc. C.351(b) M.145(b) 1930 V, at 217.
105. [1952111 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 42; [1953] II id. at 74; [1954] 1id. at 6, 99, 160-62; [1955]
lid. at 143-48; [1956] 1 id. at 212-15; and [1956] 11 id. at 30, 31.
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sion. Since it appears in the 1958 Convention under the rubric "Rules applicable
to all ships" some have claimed that the right is enjoyed by warships as well as
by merchant vessels; this is the position adopted in the black-letter formulation
in the Restatement (Third) and in the accompanying Comment, 10 6 although the
Reporters' Note does indicate the substantial dissent from this view that was
evident in the negotiations in UNCLOS 111.107
In practice neither the "right" of innocent passage of warships in the territo-
rial sea, nor the "requirement" of prior authorization or notification, are settled
either by the language of the provision in the 1958 Geneva Convention or by that
of the 1982 Convention, which in the end adopted the 1958 formulation and left
the matter essentially unresolved. 108 In state practice, direct confrontation over
this issue has usually been avoided, although, of course, certain of the major
naval powers, including the United States, continue more or less consistently to
deny the legality of a "requirement" of prior authorization or notification for
passage when such appears in the legislation of coastal states. The admission of
warships into the territorial sea has been relegated, in consequence of the failure
to resolve the matter in the three codification attempts of the past sixty years, to
the evolution of customary law. The United States did not succeed, in spite of the
conjunction of NATO and Warsaw Pact interests, in securing the acceptance of a
right of passage at UNCLOS 111.109 The negotiations in UNCLOS III have,
however, advanced the debate over the conduct of the passage of warships when
admitted to the territorial sea, since the identification of conduct that renders
passage noninnocent does now, in the formulation used in the 1982 Convention,
apply to all vessels, whether merchant ships or warships.1
10
C. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
In its Comment on the black-letter proposition concerning the regime of the
EEZ, the Restatement (Third) claims:
Recent practice of states, supported by the broad consensus achieved at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, has effectively established as
customary law the concept of the exclusive economic zone, the width of the zone (up
to 200 nautical miles), and the basic rules governing it . . . . Some of the detailed
provisions in the Convention, however, do not reflect customary law (as of 1987) and
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 513(1)(a) & comment h.
107. Id. § 513(1)(a) reporters' note 2.
108. Convention, supra note 15, art. 17; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 289-93; Burke,
supra note 31, at 515- 16.
109. See the language used in art. 29(2) of the Informal Single Negotiating Text; UNCLOS III, IIl
OFFICIAL RECORDS 183, 192, 196 & 203 (1975); I R. PLATZ6DER, supra note 10, at 20-40, 21.
110. Convention, supra note 15, art. 19. D. O'Connell, in the writer's view, correctly asserts that
"To the extent that State practice warrants the view that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage,
that catalogue concerns the mode of passage of warships." I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 292.
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will be binding only when the Convention comes into effect and only on states parties
to the Convention.'
Two points arise immediately from this assertion and from the language used in
the black-letter proposition. First, the concept of the exclusive economic zone,
as negotiated in UNCLOS III and articulated in the 1982 Convention, is that of
a separate, but functional, maritime zone, situated between the territorial sea and
the high seas. Articles 55 and 86 of the 1982 Convention, and their negotiating
history, make it clear that this maritime zone does not have a residual high seas
character, as is suggested by the language of section 514(2),12 nor does it have
a residual territorial sea character. The extension of coastal states' sovereign,
jurisdictional, and other rights to the EEZ, as it is expressed in article 56(l)(a)(b)
and (c) of the 1982 Convention, 113 rested upon an uneasy compromise in the
creation of a maritime zone that is truly sui generis.
The second point concerns the presentation of the detailed regime of the EEZ
in the Restatement (Third). There is a wide-ranging review of the principal rights
and duties of coastal states, and of other states, that are applicable in the zone as
they are set out in the 1982 Convention. "14 There is no discussion of the formula
provided in the 1982 Convention" 5 for the attribution and regulation of other
rights in the EEZ that do not fall either within the rights of coastal states or those
of "other states" as they are identified in article 58. These "unattributed rights,"
which may concern such diverse matters as aspects of the military uses of the sea,
the recovery of historic wrecks beyond the contiguous zone, and certain aspects
of marine scientific research, are likely to become of increasing importance. "1
6
Again, however, the assertions with respect to the current condition of cus-
tomary law as applied to the regime of the EEZ give the most cause for concern.
What are the "basic rules" of the regime that are "effectively established as
customary law," and what is the nature of the state practice that illustrates them
in operation? The Restatement (Third) falls far short of giving a convincing
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 514 comment a; see also id. § 514 comment j &
reporters' notes 1 & 2. See Convention, supra note 15, arts. 56, 58.
112. Which reads:
All states enjoy, as on the high seas, the freedoms of navigation and overflight,
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and the right to engage in other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those asso-
ciated with the operation of ships and aircraft. (Emphasis added.)
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 514 comment b, § 521 comment a.
113. Cf. the language used in President Reagan's Proclamation (of Mar. 10, 1983) establishing an
exclusive economic zone of the United States; 83 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2075, at 71 (1983); NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 16, Document F. 1.
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 514 comments c-i.
115. Convention, supra note 15, art. 59.
116. As possible examples, compare the limitations of the prescriptions in Convention, supra note
15, arts. 58 & 60, in their application to underwater listening devices; id. art. 303, on the recovery
of historic wrecks within the contiguous zone; and id, arts. 246(3) & 246(5) on the implied distinction
between "pure" and "applied" marine scientific research in the EEZ.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
LAW OF THE SEA 949
answer to either of these questions. Most of the claims to an EEZ that have so far
been made refer to articles 56 and 58 of the 1982 Convention,'1 7 but many
claims have not yet been supported by detailed regulations, except for fisheries.
Some states, most notably Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, have pre-
ferred to claim an exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) rather than an EEZ. 118 In the
legislation already promulgated there is considerable evidence of substantial
divergence from the 1982 Convention prescriptions. This, given the convoluted
history of the emergence of the concept of the EEZ and the welter of
complementary, overlapping, and indeed, contradictory proposals debated dur-
ing UNCLOS III, is perhaps hardly surprising, but it is not reflected in the pages
of the Restatement (Third)." 9
Nevertheless, the absence of material protest in the face of almost eighty
unilateral claims by coastal states, strongly suggests that the right to a 200-
nautical-mile EEZ has become part of customary international law, as is asserted
in the Restatement (Third). This view is supported by the somewhat vague
language used in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case in 1985: "[it is] ...incontestable that...
the exclusive economic zone ... is shown by the practice of States to have
become a part of customary law."'
120
Even if it is argued that the provisions of articles 56 and 58 of the 1982
Convention have passed in their entirety into customary law-a view that this
writer does not accept-it cannot be argued that the various obligations imposed
upon the coastal state in that Convention in respect to the exercise of jurisdic-
tional rights over fisheries, pollution, and marine scientific research have been
generally assumed as part of customary law.' 2' Although it appeared at the
conclusion of UNCLOS III that relatively few developing countries would be,
contrary to earlier general expectations, among the major beneficiaries of the
EEZ concept, some-Indonesia is a prominent example-will gain from the EEZ
maritime resources that are more substantial than their land resources.122 Yet in
many cases the delimitation of the outer limits of the EEZ has not yet been
117. See, e.g., Documents C.I (Vanuatu), C.5 (Equatorial Guinea), C.32 (Mauritania), C.33
(Brazil), C.34 (Tanzania), F.3 (Indonesia), F.6 (Gabon), in NEW DiRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA,
supra note 16.
118. See K. SIMMONDS, supra note 56, ch. III passim. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are
among the states that originally claimed a 200-nautical-mile EFZ, but have subsequently amended
their claims to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ; see NEW DIREcTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 16,
Documents F.l & F.2.
119. 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 552-69, gives an excellent concise account of the genesis
of the EEZ and of the conflicting forces at work in its evolution.
120. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13, 33.
121. I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 559-81.
122. H. Djaal, National Interests at Sea and National Development 1-3, 4, 11-15 (1989). This
unpublished paper was presented to an international conference in August 1989, and has been made
available to the writer; the author is Head of the Agency for Research and Development, Department
of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.
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determined, nor has there been substantial progress towards either the clarifica-
tion or the settlement of rights of access of neighboring landlocked or geograph-
ically disadvantaged states to the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ of a
coastal state. 123 The EEZ compromise at UNCLOS III was intended to secure for
coastal states the right to control the conservation and management of economic
resources, especially living resources, in their adjacent seas. The developing
states expected that the exercise of that right would lead to a major redistribution
of ocean resources. 124 The current practice of states suggests that it is far too
early to pronounce with any degree of certainty, as does the Restatement (Third),
on either the nature or the extent of the application of particular rules of the
regime that are set out in the 1982 Convention and that provide for inter alia, the
determination of total allowable catches by the coastal state, questions of access
to (and allocation of) surplus stocks, control over pollution, rights of navigation
and overflight, and interrelationships between the regimes of the EEZ and of the
continental shelf.
D. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
The very considerable difficulties encountered during the UNCLOS III nego-
tiations in attempts to reach agreement on the legal definition of the extent of the
continental shelf, and on the legal powers exercisable with respect to it, have
been well documented.1 25 What emerged in article 76(1) of the 1982
Convention12 6 was a legal definition of the shelf that stands apart from any
geographic definition. The new rules on the EEZ necessarily implied that a limit
of at least 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a coastal state would mean
that in some regions areas of the seabed lying beyond the limits of the physical
continental margin would be brought within national jurisdiction. Interest since
the adoption of the 1982 Convention has understandably focused upon areas
where the physical continental margin (the shelf, slope, and rise, but excluding
the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges) 127 extends beyond 200 nautical
123. See generally the selection of documents in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 16, pts. C & F.
124. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200 Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569-99 (1975); Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and
the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 289 (1981); Juda, The Exclusive
Economic Zone and Ocean Management, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305-31 (1987).
125. 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 467-509.
126. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 76(1), which reads:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the sub-
marine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is mea-
sured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
127. Id. art. 76(3).
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miles from the baselines. The 1982 Convention provides alternative formulae1 28
(all unsatisfactory) for the delimitation by the coastal state of the outer edge of
the continental margin in such cases. It also imposes a maximum extent for such
delimitation of either 350 nautical miles seaward of the baselines or the 200
metre isobath. 1
29
The Restatement (Third) broadly adopts the 1982 Convention definition 30 and
claims that this has been implicitly accepted by the United States and is "now
accepted as customary law."' 31 It does not address the more difficult question of
state practice with respect to the exercise of the prescribed sovereign rights of
coastal states for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of
the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. 132 The UNCLOS III
negotiations ended with a compromise between the so-called "margineers" (the
broad-margin states) and those states that sought a revenue-sharing arrangement
in return for conceding to coastal states the right to exploit mineral resources in
their shelves between 200 and 350 nautical miles seaward of the baselines. The
compromise is reflected in the language of article 82 of the 1982 Convention and
"payments or contributions in kind" will have to be made by such coastal states
(after the first five years of production) to the International Sea Bed Authority
(ISBA) that is to be established under the 1982 Convention.133 The failure to
produce evidence of state practice in support of the very generalized propositions
advanced in the Restatement (Third) may, here again, reflect the U.S. prefer-
ences and expectations, 134 but in practice, very few states to date have either
articulated or attempted to exercise sovereign rights in the margin beyond 200
nautical miles from their baselines. This is in no small measure because of the
complex problems left unresolved by the 1982 Convention definition of the
continental shelf. As Prescott has shown,' 35 the determination of the direction
and extent of the natural prolongation of a state's territory is highly controversial.
That controversy has recently been deepened because the International Court of
Justice discounted the structural, geological, and morphological evidence on
natural prolongation that was presented to it in the Libya/Tunisia Continental
Shelf Case. 136
128. Id. art. 76(4)(a), (b).
129. Id. art. 76(5), (6); see also Annex If to the Final Act of UNCLOS Ill, which contains an
exception to these rules with respect to the establishment of the outer edge of the continental margin
in the southern part of the Bay of Bengal. On submarine ridges only the 350-nautical-mile limit
applies.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 511 (c) and reporters' note 8. But cf. § 515 comment a.
131. Id. § 511 reporters' note 8.
132. Burke, supra note 31, at 522-23.
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 515 comment a, § 523 reporters' note 3.
134. Burke, supra note 31, at 523.
135. J.R.V. PREscorr, supra note 84, at 96-103.
136. 1982 I.C.J. 18. Note especially on this point the dissenting opinions of Judges Gros, Oda,
and Evensen, id. at 143, 157, and 278, respectively.
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IV. Exploitation of Mineral Resources of Deep Seabed
Many who consult Part V of the Restatement (Third), and certainly most
foreign observers, will turn with the greatest interest to its articulation of rights
with respect to the exploration and exploitation of ocean floor minerals beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction. That articulation is not surprising, in view of
the developments in U.S. policy since the late 1960s, but it is necessary none-
theless to review it with circumspection. The Restatement (Third) puts forward
the black-letter rule in these terms: 1
37
(1) Under international law,
(a) no state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive
rights over any part of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, or over its mineral resources, and no state or
person may appropriate any part of that area;
(b) unless prohibited by international agreement, a state may engage,
or authorize any person to engage, in activities of exploration for
and exploitation of the mineral resources of that area, provided that
such activities are conducted
(i) without claiming or exercising sovereignty or sovereign or ex-
clusive rights in any part of that area, and
(ii) with reasonable regard for the right of other states or persons to
engage in similar activities and to exercise the freedoms of the
high seas;
(c) minerals extracted in accordance with paragraph (b) become the
property of the mining state or person.
(2) Under the law of the United States, a citizen of the United States may
engage in activities of exploration for, or exploitation of, the mineral
resources of the area of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction only in accordance with a license issued by the
Federal Government pursuant to law or international agreement.
Burke has demonstrated 138 the inconsistencies between the language of section
523(1)(a) 139 and that of the United States Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act of 1980,140 which established what purported to be an interim program to
regulate the exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources
of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction by U.S. citizens. 141
The Restatement (Third), consistently with various U.S. policy declarations over
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 523; see also id. comments a-f and reporters' notes
1-5.
138. Burke, supra note 31, at 525-26.
139. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 523 comment b.
140. Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553, codified as amended principally at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401
et. seq. (1982); see 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(E)(ii) (1986).
141. See 30 U.S.C. § 1403(14) (1986).
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the years,' 42 seeks to establish analogies between the freedom of fishing on the
high seas and that of deep seabed mining:
Although there are important differences between mining and fishing operations, under
customary international law the resources of the sea-bed, like the fish in the waters
above, may be taken by anyone, provided no claim is made to sovereign or exclusive
rights over any area of the sea or sea-bed. 143
Yet, when President Koh in his formal statement at the conclusion of UNCLOS
III addressed this question, he used the following words:
Speakers for every regional and interest group expressed the view that the doctrine of
the freedom of the high seas can provide no legal basis for the grant by any State of
exclusive title to a specific mine site in the international area of the sea-bed. Many are
of the view that article 137 of the Convention has become as much a part of customary
international law as the freedom of navigation.'"
Since then, the Preparatory Commission, which was charged under the 1982
Convention with special responsibility for the establishment of the institutions of
the Convention-the International Sea Bed Authority (ISBA) and the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea-has had occasion to pronounce on the
matter in response to protests over the issuance of licenses by the United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and by the Govern-
ments of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany under their
national legislation.' 45 On August 30, 1985, the Preparatory Commission
adopted a Declaration asserting that claims incompatible with the Convention
regime for deep seabed mining "shall not be recognized [and] were illegal."1 46
On April 11, 1986, the Preparatory Committee adopted a further Declaration,
this time by vote, which rejected any claim, agreement, or action that was
incompatible with the Convention and its related Resolutions as "wholly illegal
and devoid of a basis for the creation of legal rights." 1
47
Whatever view one may adopt as to the juridical status of these Declarations,
it is clear that at the least they maintain and reinforce the views of the great
majority of the 121 states that submitted concluding statements at the end of
UNCLOS III, and that the position adopted in the Restatement (Third) cannot be
said to reflect the current consensus of views in the international community as
142. It will be recalled that the United States rejected from the outset the "moratorium" Reso-
lution of the General Assembly adopted in 1969; Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) at
1l, U.N. Doc. A/7834 (1969).
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 523 comment b (emphasis added); see also id. § 523
reporters' note 2, and the language used in the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(12).
144. U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/17, at 136 (1984).
145. Simmonds, supra note 25, at 136-38.
146. Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/72 (1985);
reprinted in NEW Dm.EcroNs IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 16, Document M.2.
147. U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/78. This Declaration was adopted by a vote of 59 to 7, with ten
abstentions.
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to unilateral claims by states to grant and exercise rights of exploration and
exploitation of deep seabed mineral resources. Sohn has claimed that "[a] uni-
versally recognized legal regime governing the exploitation of the mineral re-
sources of the deep seabed beyond the zones of national jurisdiction does not
exist at the present time," 148 and, in one significant passage, Restatement (Third)
advances the view that:
When the LOS Convention comes into effect, it will bind the parties to that Convention;
if it is accepted by nations of the world generally, without dissent by an important group
of states, the sea-bed mining regime of the Convention may become effective also as
customary international law for nonparties. 149
Earlier, in its exposition of the sources of international law, the Restatement
(Third) described customary international law as resulting from "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation," 150 but in the following Comment adds that: "in principle a state that
indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of
development is not bound by that rule even after it matures. Historically, such
dissent and consequent exemption from a principle that became general custom-
ary law has been rare.'' 151
The principle here in question is that of the juridical status of the deep seabed
beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction. The system established under the
1982 Convention for the administration of the exploration and exploitation of the
mineral resources of the ISBA is quite another matter. Is section 523(1)(b) of the
Restatement (Third), quoted above, truly reflective of current international law as
to the juridical status of the deep seabed, and is the current U.S. practice, as
encapsulated in section 523(2), consistent with the condition of customary in-
ternational law? The concept of the "common heritage" of mankind, as it was
applied to the resources of the deep seabed in article 136 of the 1982 Convention,
derives from many sources, but, in particular, from: (i) the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 27 January, 1967;152 (ii) the
Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, of 5 December, 1979; 15 3 (iii) the General Assembly "Moratorium
Resolution" ;154 and (iv) the General Assembly "Common Heritage
Declaration."' 155 Within the context of the 1982 Convention the concept has, at
the barest minimum, led not only to general acceptance of the view that deep
148. L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA 172 (1984).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 523 comment e (emphasis added); see also id. § 102
comment f.
150. Id. § 102(2).
151. Id. § 102 comment d; see also id. § 102 reporters' note 2.
152. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967).
153. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/34/664
(Nov. 12, 1979).
154. Resolution 2574-D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) at 11, U.N. Doc.A/7630 (1969).
155. Resolution 2749 (xxv), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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seabed polymetallic nodules are res communis-things belonging to all-but
also to dispute over the modalities of their accessibility.
The formulation of the black-letter rule in section 523(1)(b) of the Restatement
(Third) contains a reaffirmation of the U.S. policy position that the resources of
the deep seabed are res nullius, whereas the formulation of the basic rule in
section 523(1)(a), which follows the language of article 137 of the 1982 Con-
vention, necessarily depends on the premise that those resources are res com-
munis. This fundamental contradiction persists, without explanation, throughout
the ensuing Comments and Reporters' Notes. It underlies, of course, the policies
of the United States and of the other states involved with the "reciprocating
states' regime." The concept of the "common heritage of mankind," even in
what Pardo has described as its flawed rendering in the 1982 Convention, 156 has
at least led us to fill a jurisdictional void even if it has currently not convinced
certain states that following this concept can lead to an ordered, equitable and
feasible system of access to the management of resources.
V. Conclusion
The appearance of a new Restatement arouses a variety of expectations in the
international community. 157 It is, by virtue of its provenance and the process of
its drafting, immediately seen as a unique source of evidence-both within and
without the United States-as to the current condition of international law and to
the expected conduct of the United States in relating to that condition. Part V of
the Restatement (Third) cannot, however, in a number of very important areas,
some of which have been mentioned in this Commentary, be turned to with
confidence as an authoritative doctrinal expression of that condition at large or
even of the particular practice of the United States. Various reasons have been
advanced for these weaknesses. It is unfortunate, although hardly surprising, that
the United States Government became involved in the drafting process of the
"Foreign Relations Project." 158 Burke, at the end of his very perceptive analysis
of Part V, has concluded that: "It seems likely that the purpose of the Restate-
ment was to try to avoid or attenuate the potentially costly effects of the mis-
judgment of the Reagan Administration on the Law of the Sea Convention, but
this effort is misguided and misplaced." 15 9 That is a harsh criticism, but it is very
clear that the shadow of the so-called "ideological stand-off' ' 60 that produced
and followed the Reagan rejection of the 1982 Convention, does fall heavily over
156. Pardo, supra note 8, at 21.
157. Meessen, supra note 3, at 433-35.
158. The postponement of the adoption of the Draft was secured at the request of the Departments
of State and Justice in 1985; see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, SIXTY-SECOND ANNUAL
MEETING 374-85 (1985).
159. Burke, supra note 31, at 527.
160. Simmonds, The International Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining III, II OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N REV. 306, 310 (1987-88).
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Part V of the Restatement (Third) and has contributed to its ambivalence and
obliquity.
The selectivity of the Reporters' approach to the provisions of the inchoate
1982 Convention rests upon the assessment of the content of, and the relation-
ships between, established and emerging customary international law and the
"new" law of the Convention. They fail, however, to demonstrate the "interplay
of equities" on which its comprehensiveness and cohesiveness seeks a founda-
tion. For the 1982 Convention, which in the writer's view has many disfiguring
flaws, amounts to very much more than the sum of its parts. The 1982 Conven-
tion emphasizes, and indeed depends upon, a recognition of the close interrela-
tionships between the varying uses of ocean space. Its adoption should be seen
as the beginning of a long process to secure the flexible and equitable accom-
modation of exclusive and inclusive uses of the marine environment as a whole.
It is, as one of its most influential negotiators and draftsmen has said: "as much
a daring venture of international politics and international relations as an exercise
in international law." 161
The ideological, policy, and pragmatic reasons for the rejection of the 1982
Convention by the United States are well-known. It was perhaps to be expected,
in the wake of that rejection, that the Reporters would, in the Restatement
(Third), seek, in their analysis of customary law, state practice that would un-
derpin those propositions in the 1982 Convention that advance U.S. interests.
They have, however, gone far beyond that. Their treatment of customary law is
too often arbitrary, selective, and internally inconsistent. As a result, Part V of
the Restatement (Third), in spite of its formidable antecedents, must be used with
the greatest circumspection.
161. Jens Evensen, in a paper presented to the symposium on Denuclearization of the Oceans,
sponsored by the Myrdal Foundation and Pacem in Maribus XIII, Norrtelje, Sweden, May, 1984.
Ambassador Evensen, a Vice-President of UNCLOS III, was one of the principal architects of the
"parallel system of mining" for the resources of the ISBA that is reflected in the provisions of Part
XI of the 1982 Convention.
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